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I.

Introduction
Electronic agreements continue to fortify their presence in the digital

commercial marketplace.3 Whether used to sell goods or services, or simply to
define relationships, standardized electronic agreements have appeared in
abundance

in

business-to-business

or

business-to-consumer

transactions.

Standardized electronic agreements, like their physical counterparts, offer the
ability to address multiple concerns in a simple, efficient fashion.4 Although
electronic contracts and electronic signatures5 have been accepted and promoted
by federal and state governments, many fundamental aspects of contract law have
been left for the courts to wrestle with when disputes arise.6
Today, there are essentially two types of standardized electronic agreements—
the click-through agreement and the browse-wrap agreement.7 A click-through
agreement is an agreement that requires an offeree to click on an acceptance icon,
which evidences a manifestation of assent to be bound to the terms of a contract.
On the other hand, a browse-wrap agreement is one that is typically presented at
3

See ProCD, Inc. v. Zedienberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (applying the terms
of a licensing agreement); see also Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA)
(state legislation); Electronic Signatures in Global Commerce and National
Commerce (E-SIGN), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7001 (federal legislation). Attempts to
supplement the Uniform Commercial Code with the Uniform Computer
Information Transaction Act (UCITA) have thus far not succeeded, except in
Virginia and Maryland.
4
RESTATEMENT (2d) OF CONTRACTS §211 cmt. a ("Scarce and costly time and
skill can be devoted to a class of transaction rather than to details of individuals
transactions."); Terry J. Ilardi, Mass Licensing – Part 1: Shrinkwraps,
Clickwraps & Browsewraps, 831 PLI/Pat. 251, 255 (June 2005).
5
This term encompasses a wide variety of marks people use to show assent.
6
Cairo, Inc. v. Crossmedia Services, Inc. 2005 WL 756610, *4 (N.D. Cal. April
1, 2005) (“While new commerce on the Internet has exposed courts to many new
situations, it has not fundamentally changed the principles of contract.”);
Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 403 (2d Cir. 2004).
7
For purposes of this article the authors consider opt-in agreements as a type of
click-through agreement because an offeree has to manifest acceptance by
electronically checking a box.
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the bottom of the website and where acceptance is based on “use” of the site.
Litigation surrounding click-through agreements surfaced first, but browse-wrap
litigation soon followed.

Although neither agreement is particularly new (each

has appeared well in advance of the ensuing litigation), few state and federal
courts have addressed the enforceability of browse-wrap agreements and the
terms therein.8 The dearth of settled law surrounding browse-wrap agreements9
creates uncertainty. This article discusses the development of browse-wrap
contract law as it relates to formation, enforcement of specific terms and areas
that are still to be addressed.

II.

Creating Standardized Electronic Contracts
Legislatures at both the domestic10 and international11 levels have

committed to treating electronic contracts and electronic signatures in the same
manner as their physical counterparts. However, only a handful of courts across
the country have explored the extent of enforceability of browse-wrap
agreements.12

This predicament has left courts to revisit many fundamental

aspects of contract law such as the “offeror is the master of the offer,”13 what a
8

See Terry J. Ilardi, Mass Licensing – Part 1: Shrinkwraps, Clickwraps &
Browsewraps, PLI Order Number 5939, 831 PLI/Pat 251, 255 (June 2005).
9
Christina Kunz et al., Browse-Wrap Agreements: Validity of Implied Assent in
Electronic Form Agreements, 59 BUS. LAW. 279, 289 (2003).
10
Note the number of states that have adopted UETA and the SEC information
from Tamar’s materials.
11
MLEC preamble ("Believing that the adoption of the "Model Law on Electronic
Commerce by the Commission will assist all States significantly in enhancing
their legislation governing the use of alternatives to paper-based methods of
communication and storage of information and in formulating such legislation
where none currently exists.").
12
Christina Kunz et al., Browse-Wrap Agreements: Validity of Implied Assent in
Electronic Form Agreements, 59 BUS. LAW. 279, 282-83 (2003).
13
See generally FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, 151 (2d ed 1990); ProCD, Inc. v.
Zedienberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996) (“A vendor, as master of the
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reasonable offeree would expect, and what objective facts and legal principles
support a finding of assent to bound to the terms of a contract.
Since litigation surrounding electronic agreements has surfaced, courts
have generally focused on two fundamental components to determine whether a
valid agreement has been formed - notice and assent. Only after finding that a
contract has been formed do courts reach the interpretation or enforceability of
particular terms of agreement. This section explores the formation component of
standardized online agreements.

A.

Notice Requirements for Online Agreements
Regardless of the type of standardized electronic agreement, courts emphasize

the “notice” requirement. The focal point of this analysis is whether the offeree
saw or had a reasonable opportunity to review the contract. Notice is particularly
important in a digital environment because an agreement can be overlooked when
a hardcopy contract is unavailable.14
Click-through and browse-wrap agreements fulfill the notice requirement in
different ways. Adequate notice as to formation of a contract is usually easily
satisfied with click-through agreements.

This is because the technology

underpinning click-through agreements prohibits a user from proceeding with a
transaction without first having the opportunity to review the contract.15 Thus,
there is little ground to argue lack of notice for contract formation purposes.16
offer, may invite acceptance by conduct, and may propose limitations on the kind
of conduct that constitutes acceptance.”).
14
Christina Kunz et al., Browse-Wrap Agreements: Validity of Implied Assent in
Electronic Form Agreements, 59 BUS. LAW. 279, 290 (2003) (noting other
differences between electronic and physical contract transactions).
15
ProCD, Inc. v. Zedienberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449-1452 (7th Cir. 1996). For a
discussion on notice see Kevin W. Grierson, Enforceability of “Clickwrap” or
“Shrinkwrap” Agreements Common in Computer Software, Hardware, and
Internet Transactions, 106 ALR5th 309, 322 (2003); see also Laura Darden &
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Notice in browse-wrap agreements is given through the conspicuous display
of the contract.17 Typically, the terms and conditions appear as a hyperlink at the
bottom or top of the website and come under the guise of “legal terms” or “terms
of use.” These hyperlinks are normally highlighted in a different color from the
background text or website wallpaper.18 The actual terms do not usually appear
on the same page as the original hyperlink but are connected to another page. The
terms are, in effect, incorporated by reference.19
Unlike the click-through agreements, browse-wrap agreements do not have
the same notice guarantees because their terms are not similarly situated.
Browse-wrap agreements create a predicament in which online offerees may be
unaware that any terms are applicable. This was a point of contention in Specht v.
Netscape Communications Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002). In Specht, the
court rejected a browse-wrap agreement relating to downloading free software
because the agreement came after the invitation to download and users could
download the software without any indication that legal terms followed.20 Thus,
the court was unwilling to enforce the terms of agreement if the fruits could be
received without notice of the terms. 21

Charles Thorpe, Forming Contracts Over the Internet: Click-wrap and BrowseWrap Agreements, available at
http://gsulaw.gsu.edu/lawand/papers/su03/darden_thorpe/#11 (last visited Sept.
17, 2003).
16
However, if an end user is able to receive the fruits of the contract without
reviewing the terms of the agreement, contract formation may not necessarily
occur. Softman Products Co., LLC v Adobe Systems, Inc. 171 F.Supp.2d 1075
(C.D. Cal. 2001).
17
Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir.2004).
18
See Ticketmaster, Corp. v. Tickets.com., Inc. No. CV99765HLHVBKX (C.D.
Cal. 2003) (Ticketmaster II) (during the course of the litigation, the court noted
that Ticketmaster moved the terms of use hyperlink to the top of the webpage).
19
See Pollstar v. Gigmania Ltd., 170 F.Supp.2d 974, 980-82 (E.D. Cal. 2000).
20
Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 34-35 (2d Cir. 2002).
21
Moreover, the applicable terms of the agreement were only visible at the
bottom of the screen and there was no indication from the top screen that binding
terms were below. Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 34-
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Likewise, in Motise v. America Online, Inc., 346 F.Supp.2d 563 (SDNY
2004), the court refused to impute notice of AOL’s Terms of Service onto a nonAOL member who used the account of an AOL member when the non-member
did not have notice of the terms before he logged on.22 The court in Register.com,
Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 401-02 (2d Cir.2004), echoed a similar notice
requirement when terms were presented to the defendant concurrently with the
information it sought.23

B.

Manifesting Assent to Online Contracts
Standardized electronic agreements received their names from the manner

by which the offerees signify assent24 and each draws on two parallel principles of
contract law. In click-through agreements, a contract is formed through the
offeree’s express acceptance of the proffered terms and conditions. A browse-

35 (2d Cir. 2002); see id. at 24 (applying California law with respect to
formation); see also DeFontes & Long v. Dell Computers Corporation, C.A. No.
PC 03-2636, pg. 10 (Jan. 2004) (refusing to enforce a browse-wrap agreement
containing an arbitration clause because it was “inconspicuously located at the
bottom of the website.”).
22
Motise v. America Online, Inc., 346 F.Supp.2d 563 (SDNY 2004) (noting that
neither side cited Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp.) However, the court
held that the terms of service, including the forum selection clause, were
enforceable against the plaintiff because he was the sub-licensee of the licensee
that agreed to those terms. Motise v. America Online, Inc., 346 F.Supp.2d at 566.
23
However, the court ultimately found that defendant was well aware of the terms
and defendant’s use was not sporadic. Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d
393 (2d Cir.2004); see also Pollstar v. Gigmania Ltd., 170 F.Supp.2d 974, 981-82
(E.D. Cal. 2000) (noting the problem of not having conspicuous notice).
24
The term click-through or click-wrap agreement is a spin-off of “shrink-wrap”
agreement, which is discussed in ProCD, Inc. v. Zedienberg, 86 F. 3d 1449, 1449
(7th Cir. 1997); See Terry J. Ilardi, Mass Licensing – Part 1: Shrinkwraps,
Clickwraps & Browsewraps, PLI Order Number 5939, 831 PLI/Pat 251, 256
(June 2005).
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wrap offeree, however, creates a contract by conduct—acceptance through use of
the goods or service.25
Click-through agreements require users to assent affirmatively to terms
before downloading or using a service or product.26 Online offerees manifest
assent by clicking on icons such as “I Accept,” “I Agree” or “Yes.”27 Clickthrough agreements are “open offers” and illustrate the basic principle that
adopting a mark and placing it on the contract is all that is needed to create a
binding agreement.28
One of the first published decisions that applied this principle was ProCd,
Inc. v. Zedienberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1997). In that case, ProCD sought to
enforce its electronic license agreement against defendant Zedienberg, an end user
who used ProCD’s software for commercial purposes in violation of ProCD’s
license agreement.29 Zeidenberg claimed the contract was unenforceable because
it was not presented to him on the outside of the box.30 However, the court
rejected that argument because the agreement was clearly presented to Zeidenberg
when he installed the software, and the product could not be used without
indicating acceptance to the terms of the license by clicking on the acceptance
icon.31

25

FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 152-160 (2ed. 1990) (making a return promise or
signifying assent by conduct).
26
See Specht v. Netscape, at 21 at n.4; see also Klocek v. Gateway, Inc. 104 F.
Supp.2d 1332, 1338 cmt. 6 (D.C. Kansas 2000); Ticketmaster Corp. v.
Tickets.com, Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis 6483, Copy L. Rep. (CCH) ¶28607 (C.D.
Cal. Mar. 6, 2003).
27
Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., (2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis 6483, Copy L.
Rep. (CCH) ¶28607 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2003)).
28
See generally FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 144-155 (2ed. 1990).
29
ProCD, Inc. v. Zedienberg, 86 F.3d 1449, 1450 (7th Cir. 1997).
30
ProCD, Inc. v. Zedienberg, 86 F.3d 1449, 1450 (7th Cir. 1997).
31
ProCD, Inc. v. Zedienberg, 86 F.3d 1449, 1952 (7th Cir. 1997). The same logic
was also applied in Caspin v. Microsoft Network, LLC, 732 A.2d 528 (1999);
Forrest v. Verizon Communications, Inc., 805 A.2d 1007 (D.C. 2002) (enforcing a
forum selection clause).
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In contrast, browse-wrap agreements do not require users to assent
affirmatively to the terms; rather, the agreement is formed by accepting or using
the product or service.32 The legal basis for this agreement stems from the
“implied-in-fact” principle, whereby conduct alone serves as the basis for
assent.33
Although “implied” assent is less clear than an express assent, “the
distinction as such has no legal consequences.”34 One of the first browse-wrap
cases to address the enforceability of a browse-wrap agreement and apply this
principle was Pollstar v. Gigmania Ltd. 170 F.Supp.2d 974 (E.D. Cal. 2000).35 In
Pollstar, the defendant argued the browse-wrap agreement at issue failed as a
matter of law because there was no mutual assent.36 The court, however, declined
to invalidate the browse-wrap agreement because it recognized that “people
sometimes enter into a contract by using a service without first seeing the terms
.…”37 Similarly, in Ticketmaster v. Tickets.com, 2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis 6483,
Copy L. Rep. (CCH) ¶28607 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2003), the Court denied
defendant’s motion for summary judgment and ruled that a contract is formed “by

32

See Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis 6483, Copy
L. Rep. (CCH) ¶28607 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2003); Cairo, Inc. v. Crossmedia
Services, Inc. 2005 WL 756610, *4 (N.D. Cal. April 1, 2005) (“It is standard
contract doctrine that when a benefit is offered subject to stated conditions, and
the offeree makes a decision to take the benefit with knowledge of the terms of
the offer, the taking constitutes acceptances of the terms, which accordingly
become binding on the offeree.”)
33
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 135 (2ed. 1990); See Ticketmaster Corp. v.
Tickets.com, Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis 6483, Copy L. Rep. (CCH) ¶28607 (C.D.
Cal. Mar. 6, 2003); Christina Kunz et al., Browse-Wrap Agreements: Validity of
Implied Assent in Electronic Form Agreements, 59 BUS. LAW. 279, 281 (2003).
34
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 135 (2ed. 1990).
35
See Pollstar v. Gigmania Lt. 170 F. Supp.2d 974, 981 (2000) (“No reported
cases have ruled on the enforceability of browse wrap license [agreements]”).
36
See Pollstar v. Gigmania Ltd., 170 F. Supp.2d 974, 982 (2000).
37
See Pollstar v. Gigmania Ltd., 170 F. Supp.2d 974, 982 (2000).
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proceeding into the interior webpages after knowledge (or in some cases
presumptive knowledge) of the conditions accepted when doing so.”38

III.

Enforcing Browse-Wrap Terms
To date, some state and federal courts have addressed the validity of browse-

wrap agreements. Apart from that formation analysis, however, is whether terms
included in the browse-wrap agreement should be enforced. No judicial district
has developed a complete body of law regarding the enforceability of all the terms
typically contained in browse-wrap agreements. Nevertheless, a perusal of the
many websites reveals that there are essentially three categories of terms found in
a browse-wrap agreement: Mandatory Terms, Prohibitory Terms and Consumer
Protection Terms.39 This section discusses the circumstances in which each
category has been addressed by the courts.

A.

Mandatory Terms
Mandatory Terms effectively require a party to act in a certain manner

when disputes arise from transactions or actions on a website.40 Provisions
relating to arbitration, forum selection and choice of law are examples of
38

Ticketmaster v. Tickets.com, 2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis 6483, Copy L. Rep. (CCH)
¶28607 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2003).
39
For a different characterization see Sharon K. Sandeen, The Sense and
Nonsense of Web Site Terms of Use Agreements, 26 HAMLINE L. REV. 499, 508
(2003). Sandeen characterizes these terms as “Representations, Disclosures, and
Instructions” and “User and Rights and Obligations.”
40
Courts have routinely enforced mandatory terms within click-through contracts.
For example, in Forrest v. Verizon Communications, 805 A.2d 1007 (DC 2002),
the court enforced a forum selection clause against an end user that had the
opportunity to review the terms. Similarly, in Caspi v. Microsoft Network the
court enforced a click-through agreement relating to a forum selection clause. The
court in Lieschke vs. RealNetworks also enforced an arbitration clause presented
on the web by click-through agreement to stay court proceedings in Illinois
pending arbitration in Washington.
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mandatory terms. These terms are the most onerous of all terms and are typically
contained in browse-wrap agreements.41 Courts across the country have
addressed mandatory terms in the browse-wrap context several times.42
In Cairo, Inc. v. Crossmedia Services, Inc. 2005 WL 756610 (N.D. Cal.
April 1, 2005), the court addressed whether defendant Crossmedia’s browse-wrap
agreement and forum selection clause were enforceable against plaintiff Cairo in a
declaratory relief action. Cairo claimed, among other things, that its business
practice of using Crossmedia’s retailer sale/promotional information for
41

Christina Kunz et al., Browse-Wrap Agreements: Validity of Implied Assent in
Electronic Form Agreements, 59 BUS. LAW. 279, 281 (2003).
42
An often cited case for authority to allow enforcement of mandatory clauses
such as forum selection clauses without affirmative consent comes from Carnival
Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991). In Carnival Cruise, the
Supreme Court addressed whether the forum selection clause within a passenger
ticket would be enforceable against a passenger injured aboard one of the
defendant's ships. The type of contract at issue in that case was a commercial
passage agreement contract wherein it was stated "the acceptance of this ticket by
the person or persons named hereon as passengers shall be deemed to be an
acceptance and agreement by each of them of all of the terms and conditions of
this Passage Ticket.' " The court found that no affirmative manifestation of assent
was necessary in order for that term to be bound and enforced against the injured
passenger. In fact, the Court stated "'Common sense dictates that a ticket of this
kind will be a form contract the terms of which are not subject to negotiation ….’"
Id. at 593.
The court looked to see if it would be reasonable to enforce this term and
concluded that it was unreasonable to assume that the forum selection clause
would be negotiated with every passenger. Moreover, it was reasonable for cruise
liners in "limiting the forum in which it potentially could be subject to suit," and
the clause was reasonable because it dispelled "any confusion" as to the forum for
resolution, sparing all parties and judicial resources from disputing that issue, and
those savings are ultimately passed on to the passengers. Id. at 593-595. Finally,
the court dismissed any bad faith on Carnival Cruise Lines’s part because the
chosen forum was its principal place of business and there was no evidence of
fraud. The court also supported its decision by reasoning that the plaintiffs could
have rejected those terms before proceeding with the transaction. Id. at 594. In
sum, the court concluded that “’in light of the present-day commercial realities
and expanding international trade we conclude that the forum selection clause
should control absent a strong showing that it should be set aside.’” Id. at 591,
quoting The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 US 1, 12-13 (1972).
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competitive purposes was not an unfair business practice. Crossmedia moved to
dismiss based on the forum selection clause contained in its Terms of Use
browse-wrap agreement posted on its website. Crossmedia argued that Cairo
assented to the terms of the browse-wrap agreement posted on the company’s
website, but Cairo argued that no contract was formed without its express consent.
The court rejected Cairo’s contention and found Cairo had notice of the terms,
and its frequent use of the website established grounds to impute Cairo’s
knowledge of and agreement to the terms of the browse-wrap agreement.
Next, the court addressed the validity of the forum selection clause and
looked to the basic contract principles as its starting point.43 At the outset, the
court ruled that the party challenging the clause has a “’heavy burden of proof’”
and must “’clearly show that enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust, or
that the clause was invalid for such reasons as fraud or overreaching’”44 Cairo
failed to do so and the court readily enforced the term because Cairo failed to
allege fraud or any overreaching defects with the contract that would render the
forum selection clause unenforceable.45
A forum selection clause was also addressed in Net2Phone v. Superior
Court, 109 Cal.App.4th 583 (2003). In Net2Phone, plaintiff Consumer Cause
brought an action against defendant Net2Phone under California’s Unfair
Competition Law. Consumer Cause was not a subscriber to Net2Phone’s Internet
phone services but sought to enjoin Net2Phone’s practice of “rounding-up”
charges to the nearest minute regardless of the actual time used.46 Net2Phone
43

Cairo, Inc. v. Crossmedia Services, Inc. 2005 WL 756610, *4 (N.D. Cal. April
1, 2005).
44
Cairo, Inc. v. Crossmedia Services, Inc. 2005 WL 756610, *4 (N.D. Cal. April
1, 2005), quoting The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 US 1, 15 (1972).
45
Cairo, Inc. v. Crossmedia Services, Inc. 2005 WL 756610, *4 (N.D. Cal. April
1, 2005).
46
The specific issue in this case was whether a private attorney general was
“closely related” to the consumers who were bound by the terms of the
agreement, which included a forum selection clause. Net2Phone v. Superior
Court 109 Cal.App.4th 583, 588-89 (2003).
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moved to dismiss or stay the action in the trial court pursuant to both an End User
License Agreement, and a Terms of Use browse-wrap agreement posted on each
page of the website. The trial court denied the motion and Net2Phone sought a
writ of mandamus.
The appellate court found that the browse-wrap agreement was valid and
enforced the forum selection clause. When it specifically addressed the forum
selection clause, the court, like the Cairo court, reiterated the basic law related
thereto.47 Thereafter, the court rejected the defendant’s proposition that it was
unfair that the terms had to be accessed through a hyperlink and that the clause
was unenforceable because it was offered on a take it or leave it basis.48
In Hubbert et al. v. Dell Corp. No. 02-L-786 (Ill. App. Ct. 8/12/2005), the
Illinois Appellate Court addressed both a choice of law provision and arbitration
clause in a browse-wrap agreement. In Hubbert, putative class action plaintiffs
filed a complaint against Dell Corporation for allegedly engaging in false and
misleading advertising with respect to a microprocessor. Dell moved to dismiss
or, in the alternative, compel arbitration pursuant to the Terms and Conditions of
Sale hyperlink located on the bottom of each of the webpages on Dell’s site.
The court held the choice of law clause was reasonably related to the
transaction because Dell was based in Texas and the matter involved basic
contract law.49 Further, the court held that the choice of law clause posed no
public policy obstacles to the enforcement thereof.
Next, the appellate court addressed the validity of the arbitration clause.
Plaintiffs argued that the clause was not part of the contract because they were not
required to press on an “I Accept” button (i.e., a click-through button). The lower
court sided with plaintiffs and held the term was not part of the online agreement
because (1) defendant did not provide text that manifested clear assent to the
47

Net2Phone v. Superior Court, 109 Cal.App.4th 583, 588-89 (2003).
Net2Phone v. Superior Court, 109 Cal.App.4th 583, 588-89 (2003).
49
Hubbert et al. v. Dell Corp. No. 02-L-786 (Ill. App. Ct. 8/12/2005) (citing
Falbe v. Dell, Inc., No. 04-C-1425 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
48
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terms and conditions prior to completing the transaction, (2) the terms and
conditions were not displayed on a web page that the plaintiffs had completed in
placing their orders, and (3) no language on the website suggested that plaintiffs
were performing an affirmative act that would bind them to submit their claims to
arbitration.
The appellate court reversed the lower court and held the Terms and
Conditions of Sale were part of the agreement. First, the appellate court noted
that hyperlinked terms were conspicuously located on multiple pages in the
ordering process and should therefore be treated in a similar fashion to a
“multipage written paper contract.” Second, the court found that notice of the
terms should be imputed to plaintiffs because they had to go through three
different pages before completing the transaction, all of which stated "’All sales
are subject to Dell's Term[s] and Conditions of Sale.’"50
The appellate court also reversed the trial court’s finding that the
arbitration clause was unconscionable. First, the court found that the term was
not procedurally unconscionable because the contrasting font of the hyperlink
made it conspicuous. Further, the court rejected the contention that adhesion
contracts are automatically unconscionable. Second, the court found the
substantial unconscionability argument equally untenable because, inter alia, the
arbitration forum was not inherently biased nor did class action law enhance
plaintiffs’ rights to avoid the substantive rights and obligations of the parties.
However, unlike the Illinois court in Hubbert, the Specht v. Netscape
Communications Corp. court appears to have applied a more stringent standard to
mandatory arbitration provisions than did the Illinois court, ostensibly because
such a provision is a de facto waiver of the First Amendment right to have
disputes decided in a court of law.

50

The language explicitly contained wording relating to “Conditions of Sale” as it
related the sale of products, not the use of the website.
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For example, in Specht the court invalidated a browse-wrap agreement
that contained an arbitration clause.

In that case, defendant Netscape moved to

compel a putative class of plaintiffs to arbitrate their issues pertaining to a
software program available on Netscape’s website. Plaintiffs opposed the motion
and claimed they had no notice of defendant’s website license terms and that there
was no formation. The court affirmed the lower court and held that no agreement
was formed as no mutual assent existed.51 While the court’s holding expressly
referred to the entire license agreement, the court analyzed the arbitration clause
in terms of an arbitration agreement52 as well and appeared particularly troubled
about enforcing the arbitration clause without any indication that arbitration could
be a consequence of downloading the software.53

B.

Prohibitory Terms
Prohibitory terms refer to restrictive terms that are essentially explanatory

in nature. Prohibitory terms typically define rights associated with intellectual
property and proprietary information. The following cases show the instances in
51

Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 35 (2d Cir. 2002)
(holding that plaintiffs are not bound by the arbitration clause contained in
[defendants’ license] terms”).
52
See Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 30 (2d Cir. 2002)
(“Arbitration agreements are no exception to the requirements of manifestations
of assent.”)
53
Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 32 (2d Cir. 2002).
Hubbert and Specht appear to be irreconcilable. It appears that in Hubbert the
Illinois court was driven, in part, to its holding because the terms of use appeared
on several pages that were part of the purchasing process. However, in Specht,
the consumer could receive the free software and be bound by the terms by simply
clicking on a download link that was well above the terms of use. Nevertheless,
the language to which the Illinois court referred is located at the bottom of Dell’s
website. Based on the author’s analysis of the website there is no indication that
the purchase of products carries with it terms of agreement. Thus, to that extent,
the facts and holdings of both cases appear to be irreconcilable. However, when a
customer wishes to make a purchase, he or she must now affirmatively accept the
terms and conditions of sale.
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which browse-wrap agreements have been litigated in terms of commercial use of
information or use beyond merely informational usage.54
In Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004), the
circuit court reviewed a preliminary injunction order against Verio on unfair
competition grounds brought by Register.com.55 Specifically, Register.com sued
Verio, an entity that was using the personally identifiable information posted by
Register.com56 to solicit business from people or entities that registered for a
domain name with Register.com. Verio’s actions were in direct contravention of
the agreement posted by Register.com, which was displayed in tandem with the
personally identifiable information. Verio claimed that it was not bound by the
terms of agreement because the terms were not displayed until after the request
for information was made.57 In effect, Verio argued that it had not received notice
of the terms and conditions. The court rejected Verio’s argument because Verio
had visited Register.com’s site many times and knew the terms and conditions
that came with the site.58
Verio also contended that it was not bound by the agreement because
Verio did not click on an “I agree” icon.59 The court rejected that argument as

54

See also FareChase Inc. v. American Airlines, No. 067-194022-02 (D.C.
Tex.(Feb 12, 2003), available at
http://www.eff.org/legal/cases/AA_v_Farechase/20030310_prelim_inj.pdf
(granting a preliminary injunction for using the information on the website for
commercial purposes), appeal at 02-03-00082-CV.
55
The court never reached the merits of Register.com because the court reviewed
the grant of preliminary injunction where the plaintiff need only show a likelihood
of success on the merits.
56
A noteworthy distinction is that Register.com does not stand for precedence
relating to the consent before consumer information is given.
57
Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 401 (2d Cir. 2004).
58
The court specifically made a distinction between Verio’s use and the use of a
consumer that used the website only once or a few times. Register.com, Inc. v.
Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 401 (2d Cir. 2004). The court intimated that in the latter
scenario, the “notice” argument could carry more force.
59
Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 402 (2d Cir. 2004).
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well and noted that contracts are enforced when an offeree takes the benefit of the
contract, even when assent is not expressly communicated.60
The court faced a slightly different unfair competition issue on a motion to
dismiss in Pollstar v. Gigmania, 170 F.Supp.2d 975 (E.D.Cal. 2000). In that case,
Pollstar alleged a violation of California’s Unfair Competition Act and a breach of
contract claim. Pollstar claimed that it created, at great expense to itself, a
database of up-to-date and time sensitive information about future concert
performances.61 Pollstar claimed that Gigmania uses the information compiled by
Pollstar to compete against it and, in essence, “free-rides” on the information
Pollstar has compiled.62 Pollstar claimed Gigmania’s “free-ride” use was a breach
of the browse-wrap agreement.63 Gigmania claimed that the contract failed as a
matter of law because there was no mutual assent and moved to dismiss.64 The
district court denied Gigmania’s motion to dismiss after it recognized that
Gigmania had notice of the terms of license, albeit the terms were not that
conspicuous.65
Litigation in the context of unfair competition also surfaced in
Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com. One point of contention in that case related to
the claim that Tickets.com, in contravention of the browse-wrap agreement (once
at the bottom of the website and by the time of litigation on the top), improperly
used Ticketmaster’s concert event information and deep-linked into
Ticketmaster’s website.66 Defendant Tickets.com moved for summary judgment

60

Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 403 (2d Cir. 2004).
Pollstar v. Gigmania, 170 F.Supp.2d 975, 976 (E.D.Cal. 2000).
62
Pollstar v. Gigmania, 170 F.Supp.2d 975, 977 (E.D.Cal. 2000).
63
Pollstar v. Gigmania, 170 F.Supp.2d 975, 977 (E.D.Cal. 2000).
64
Pollstar v. Gigmania, 170 F.Supp.2d 975, 980 (E.D.Cal. 2000). Defendant also
claimed that plaintiff’s unfair competition claim was preempted by the Copyright
Act, but the court rejected that argument because plaintiff had pled that the
information was “hot news.” Id.
65
Pollstar v. Gigmania, 170 F.Supp.2d 975, 980 (E.D.Cal. 2000).
66
See http://computing-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/deep+linking (Providing
a hyperlink on a website or on the results page of a search engine to a page on
61
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on the breach of contract claim. The court found that since Tickets.com could
have had notice of the license and a contract may be formed after Tickets.com
moved through the website’s interior pages, Ticket.com’s motion for summary
judgment must be denied.67

IV.

The Final Frontiers
The case law discussed above has essentially required courts to move

through a three step analysis with respect to browse-wrap agreements and the
terms contained therein. First, courts addressed whether “notice” was properly
rendered. Second, courts looked to how consent was given and whether it would
be fair under the particular circumstances to find assent. These two steps
essentially pertain to formation. The third step focused on whether the
substantive requirements for the particular terms have been met. Put another
way, that analysis entails looking at the relationship of the clause to the thing
bargained for.
Onerous terms such as those with respect to choice of law, forum selection
and binding arbitration terms have been enforced in different jurisdictions. The
last category yet to yield decisions in the browse-wrap context relates to
Consumer Protection Terms. With that said, however, courts have not yet
addressed facets of the Prohibitory Terms pertaining to the use of copyrights and
trademarks.68 Nevertheless, given that intellectual property rights are similar to

another website that is not the website's home page. Many results of a search
engine provide deep links to websites, because many search engines index any
and all pages on the Web.)
67
Ticketmaster v. Tickets.com, 2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis 6483, Copy L. Rep. (CCH)
¶28607 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2003).
68
An owner's intellectual property rights are largely defined by statute; for
example, the Copyright Act 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101 et seq. and the Lanham Act
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the rights afforded to a business’ “hot news” information posted on a website, it is
very likely that intellectual property rights will be given the same protection.69
Consumer Protection Terms arise out of concepts of fairness and equity.70
Terms falling within this category generally aim to protect the public.
Encompassed in this category are terms relating to the use of personal
information, limitations on damages, and warranties.71 This section discusses
whether the browse-wrap online contract model fits the particular term that is
trying to be enforced and looks at the substantive requirements for the particular
term.

A.

Warranties and Remedies
Contractual terms that disclaim warranties and limit remedies are well

established in traditional contract law. The sale of goods is governed by some
version of every state’s Uniform Commercial Code and services are governed by

Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act) 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051-1127 define the
rights of copyright and trademark respectively.
The reader should further note that the Court declined to address the
copyright arguments in Pollstar v.Gigmania, Ltd., 170 F.Supp.2d 974, 981 (E.D.
Cal. 2000) and related defenses because copyright infringement was not pled.
69
Sharon K. Sandeen, The Sense and Nonsense of Web Site Terms of Use
Agreements, 26 HAMLINE L. REV. 499, 513 (2003) (noting that intellectual
property notices are superfluous).
To the extent that a set of terms are over encompassing as to copyrights
and valid uses, it will be subject to defenses such as copyright misuse. See
Davidson & Associates, Inc. v, Internet Gateway, 334 F.Supp.2d 1164, 1182; see
also Mathew D. Walden, Could Fair Use Equal Breach of Contract, An Analysis
of Informational Website User Agreements, 58 WASH. & LEE L.R. 1625, 1629-30,
1662-63 (citing to 17 U.S.C. § 301 and noting that fair use defense will supersede
use rights limited under state contract law).
70
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 323 (2ed. 1990).
71
For an analysis of how limitations on remedies have been treated in the clickthrough context see i.Lan Systems, Inc. v. NetScout Service Level Corp., 183 F.
Supp.2d 328 (D.Mass 2002).

18

the common law. Websites typically follow the same rules of governance,72 but
most websites mix components of each of these general categories making it
necessary to evaluate the primary purpose of the contract.73

1.

Substantive Law Pertaining to Goods: Warranties and
Remedies
The sale of goods over the web is governed by Article 2 of the Uniform

Commercial Code, although the extent to which Article 2 applies to intangible
items like computer programs is still being debated. 74
Article 2 describes three types of warranties: an express warranty,75 implied
warranty of merchantability76 and implied warranty for a particular purpose.77
Express warranties can be created by an affirmation of fact, a description of the
goods or a sale of the model.78 Implied warranties of merchantability are created
when merchants who deal in goods of the kind in dispute hold themselves out as
“having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practice or goods involved in the
72

UCITA has created another category pertaining to informational content. That
term refers to text, sound or images displayed to the recipient and not to the
underlying program used to deliver that content. See UCITA §§102(a)(37) &
102(a)(52) (published information content) & cmt. 33. For example, a “Westlaw
search program is not informational content, but the text of the case is.” UCITA
§102 cmt. 46. Most information available on websites consists of published
informational content as it is made for the public at large.
UCITA has only been adopted by Maryland and Virginia. Other states
view that statutory scheme as too favorable to merchants. Nevertheless, to a large
extent the analysis relevant to Article 2 will apply with regard to informational
content.
73
See generally Raymond T. Nimmer, Images and Contract Law--What Law
Applies to Transactions in Information, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 32 (1999).
74
U.C.C. § 2-105 ("The definition of goods is based on the concept of
movability"); Steven P. Mandell et al., Drafting Software Licenses for Litigation,
879 PLI/Pat. 649, 677-78(Oct.-Dec. 2006).
75
U.C.C. § 2-313.
76
U.C.C. § 2-314.
77
U.C.C. § 2-315.
78
U.C.C. 2-313(1)(a)-(c).
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transaction."79 Finally, the implied warranty for a particular purpose applies to
sellers that know how the particular buyer wishes to use the good.80
Apart from express warranties, which are exceptionally difficult to disclaim,
offerors may simply use the specific terminology as enumerated under Article 2.81
79

U.C.C. § 2-104(1); Walter A. Effross, The Legal Architecture of Virtual Stores:
World Wide Web Sites and the Uniform Commercial Code, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
1263, 1310 (1997). Under UCITA section 404(b):
“There is no [implied] warranty under subsection (a) with respect to:
(1) subjective characteristics of the informational content, such as the aesthetics,
appeal, and suitability to taste; ¶ (2) published informational content; or ¶ (3) a
person that acts as a conduit or provides no more than editorial services in
collecting, compiling, distributing, processing, providing, or transmitting
informational content that under the circumstances can be identified as that of a
third person.”
80
U.C.C. 2-315; See also UCITA §404 cmt. 1 (“This section creates a new
implied warranty. The warranty focuses on data conveyed in a relationship of
reliance. It recognizes an implied assurance in such contracts that no data
inaccuracies are caused by a failure of reasonable care.”). Under UCITA section
404(a) an implied warranty is attached to a merchant’s specially created
informational content. That section states:
“Unless the warranty is disclaimed or modified, a merchant that, in a
special relationship of reliance with a licensee, collects, compiles, processes,
provides, or transmits informational content, warrants to that licensee that there is
no inaccuracy in the informational content caused by the merchant's failure to
perform with reasonable care.”
See also UCITA 404(a) & cmt. 2:
“This warranty is based on the expectation of a person receiving data in a special
relationship of reliance that the data are not made inaccurate because of the
provider's lack of reasonable care in performing the contract. The warranty is
limited to inaccuracies caused by a failure to use reasonable care. One who hires
an expert cannot expect infallibility unless the express terms clearly so require.
Reasonable efforts, not perfect results, provide the appropriate standard in the
absence of express terms to the contrary….What constitutes reasonable care
depends on the commercial circumstances and the contracted for duties. For
example, in a contract to transmit computer information, there is no duty to screen
or vouch for accuracy, but merely to avoid a lack of reasonable care in the
transmission that causes inaccuracies. A data provider in a context where major
loss of human life is possible has a higher degree of care than a provider in other
settings.”
81
17 Am. Jur.2d Consumer Product Warranty Acts §§5 et seq. (discussing the
Manguson-Moss Warranty Act).
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For example, to disclaim a warranty of merchantability, merchants are required to
mention "merchantability" when disclaiming the implied warranty.82 Warranties
for a particular purpose may be disclaimed by simply using generally known
phrases like, “AS IS.”83 Both, however, require the disclaimer be conspicuously
located.84 Under article 2-316, all three warranties may be disclaimed by contract

82

U.C.C. § 2-316 cmt.3
U.C.C. § 2-316(3) & cmt.4 (“Unlike the implied warranty of
merchantability, implied warranties of fitness for a particular purpose may
be excluded by general language ….”); See also UCITA § 406(1) requires
specific language be used as well:
(A) To disclaim or modify the implied warranty arising under
Section 403, language must mention "merchantability" or "quality"
or use words of similar import and, if in a record, must be
conspicuous.¶ (B) To disclaim or modify the implied warranty
arising under Section 404, language in a record must mention
"accuracy" or use words of similar import.
83

84

U.C.C. § 2-316(2); U.C.C. §103(b) ("Conspicuous," with reference to a term,
means so written, displayed, or presented that a reasonable person against which it
is to operate ought to have noticed it. A term in an electronic record intended to
evoke a response by an electronic agent is conspicuous if it is presented in a form
that would enable a reasonably configured electronic agent to take it into account
or react to it without review of the record by an individual. Whether a term is
"conspicuous" or not is a decision for the court. Conspicuous terms include the
following:
(i) for a person:
(A) a heading in capitals equal to or greater in size than the
surrounding text, or in contrasting type, font, or color to the surrounding
text of the same or lesser size; and
(B) language in the body of a record or display in larger type than
the surrounding text, or in contrasting type, font, or color to the
surrounding text of the same size, or set off from surrounding text of the
same size by symbols or other marks that call attention to the language;
and
(ii) for a person or an electronic agent, a term that is so placed in a record
or display that the person or electronic agent may not proceed without taking
action with respect to the particular term.;
See also A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal.App.3d 473, 483 n.5 (1982),
citing Civ. Code §1201 (“A term or clause is conspicuous when it is so written
that a reasonable person against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed it. A
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and there is no requirement that consumers expressly consent to the disclaiming
of those terms.
Article 2 also specifically enumerates the types of remedies available in
the event of a seller’s or buyer’s breach.85 Damages may take the form of
consequential or incidentals,86 specific performance or replevin,87 liquidation or
limitation of damages,88 cancellation or recession,89 contractual modification or
limitation of remedy.90 The sections most pertinent to this analysis, however, are
those relating to (1) liquidation damages and (2) limitations of remedy because
they do not apply by default.
Under 2-718(1), liquidated damages must be “reasonable in light of the
anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach.” Damages that are unreasonable
will not be enforced and may also be considered unconscionable.91 Moreover,
liquidation damages should only be used if damages will be difficult to estimate.
Another limitation on damages comes from section 2-719, wherein it states that
parties may agree to limit available remedies to repair or replace. Terms as such
must be clear and cannot be unconscionable.
Section 2-718 does not require that express assent be evidenced before
parties may enforce the liquidated damages provisions. In contrast, parties must

printed heading in capitals … is conspicuous. Language in the body of a form is
'conspicuous' if it is in larger or other contrasting type or color.”); See also Hulsey
v. Elsinore Parachute Center, 168 Cal.App.3d 333, 339 & n.1 (1985).
85
U.C.C. 2-701 et seq.
86
U.C.C. 2-710 (Seller’s incidentals); 2-715 (Buyers rights).
87
U.C.C. 2-716 (Buyers rights).
88
U.C.C. 2-718.
89
U.C.C. 2-720.
90
U.C.C. 2-719.
91
U.C.C. 2-718(a) & cmt. 1 (noting “A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated
damages is expressly made void as a penalty. An unreasonably small amount
would be subject to similar criticism and might be stricken under the section on
unconscionable contracts or clauses.”).
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“expressly” agree to repair and replace damages in order for them to be the
exclusive remedy.92

2.

Applicability of Browse-Wrap Agreements to Limitations
on Damages in Goods Transactions

Based on the foregoing law, there appears to be no impediment to
enforcing browse-wrap agreements that disclaim warranties. Disclaimers must be
“conspicuous.” This means that the terms within the browse-wrap agreement
must put a reasonable person on notice that a disclaimer exists. If courts choose
to import the warranty conspicuous requirement to contract formation as well, the
analysis could lead to different results because many disclaimers are located at the
bottom of the website in font size smaller than size 10. Therefore, contracts like
that could be classed as inconspicuous.93 Merchants disclaiming warranties
related to the implied warranty of merchantability or warranty for a particular

92

U.C.C. 2-719(1)(b). Like Article 2, UCITA provides that parties may seek to
limit the extent to which the nonbreaching may recover. Although consequential
and incidental damages may be limited or modified in some circumstances, these
damages are not recoverable for informational content absent a special
relationship under UCITA. See UCITA §§ 803(d), 807(b)(1); 404(a). When
incidental and consequential damages are limited, though, their limitation must
not be "unconscionable." UCITA § 803(d). In addition, under section 804, parties
may stipulate to damages and limit the amount either side may recover if that
amount is "reasonable in light of: (1) the anticipated loss at the time of
contracting; (2) the actual loss; or (3) the actual or anticipated difficulties of
proving loss in the event of breach." UCITA § 804. Section 804 uses limiting
language like "reasonable" and like section 803, liquidated damages are limited
with words like "unconscionable." On the other hand, if parties choose the "repair
or replace" option, parties may "expressly agree" that the merchant provide
accurate information in its stead. UCITA § 803(a)(2). In sum, the “remedy
limiting” sections of UCITA are virtually identical to Article 2.
93
See Hubbert et al. v. Dell Corp. No. 02-L-786 (Ill. App. Ct. 8/12/2005).

23

purpose should locate the warranty/contract very close to the “Buy Now” button
or else run the risk of having that disclaimer rendered useless.94
Nevertheless, express assent is not required before warranties are
disclaimed. Thus, an implied-in-fact analysis may be used to show assent to the
warranty disclaimer. That analysis does not necessarily apply with respect to
terms limiting remedies to repair and replacing substandard products, however.
This is because section 2-719 requires that parties “expressly” agree to those types
of remedies. A contract based on an implied-in-fact assent, i.e. where there is no
clear assent, will face obstacles to enforcement. The practical effect of failing to
obtain an offeree’s express consent will mean that the return, repair and
replacement limitation will be considered an option rather than the exclusive
remedy.

Thus, using a browse-wrap agreement may not be adequate to limit

damages to repair or replace a defective good.95

3.

Substantive Law Pertaining to Services: Warranties and
Remedies
Contracts for services are governed under the common law principles. If

companies provide services through the use of computers such as internet access,
electronic storage, and internet radio, the common law will likely govern as
well.96
94

See also DeFontes & Long v. Dell Computers Corporation, C.A. No. PC 032636, pg. 10 (Jan. 2004) (refusing to enforce a browse-wrap agreement containing
an arbitration clause because it was “inconspicuously located at the bottom of the
website.”); Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 34-35 (2d
Cir. 2002).
95
U.C.C. 2-719 cmt. 2 (requiring that “If the parties intend the term to describe
the sole remedy under the contract, this must be clearly expressed”).
96
See Lee Kissman, Revised Article 2 and Mixed Goods/Information
Transactions: Implication for Courts, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 561, 577 &
n.115 (2004); Jennifer Cannata, Time Is Running Out For Customized Software
Resolving The Goods Versus Service Controversy For Year 2000 Contractual
Disputes, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 283 (1999); Raymond T. Nimmer, Images and
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In the context of service contracts, the performance of the service is
generally not discussed in terms of warranties.97 The obligations regarding the
standards of performance are grounded in principles of tort, stemming from
contractual relations.98 The Restatement (Second) of Torts 299A states “one who
undertakes to render services in the practice of a profession or trade is required to
exercise the skill and knowledge normally possessed by members of that
profession or trade ….”99 Willinston also states that a promisor rendering
performance is obligated to perform with “reasonable care."100 Moreover, no
implied warranties are accorded to offerees in service contracts.101 Thus, unlike
the law pertaining to goods, no particular language must be used to disclaim
warranties as such. However, the well settled law related to procedural and
substantive unconscionability will still apply.102

Contract Law--What Law Applies to Transactions in Information, 36 HOUS. L.
REV. 1, 32-34 (1999); see generally Advent Systems, Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925
F.2d 670 (3d Cir. 1991).
97
Raymond T. Nimmer, Images and Contract Law--What Law Applies to
Transactions in Information, 36 Hous. L. Rev. 1, 45 (1999) cf Centex Homes v.
Buecher, 95 S.W.3d 266, 272-73 (2002) (holding that “[t]hrough the implied
warranty of good workmanship, the common law recognizes that a new home
builder should perform with at least a minimal standard of care.”)
98
Raymond T. Nimmer, Images and Contract Law--What Law Applies to
Transactions in Information, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 47-48 n.163-168 (1999)
(collecting cases).
99
Raymond T. Nimmer, Images and Contract Law--What Law Applies to
Transactions in Information, 36 Hous. L. Rev. 1, 32-34 (1999).
100
Raymond T. Nimmer, Images and Contract Law--What Law Applies to
Transactions in Information, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 48 n.170 (1999) citing 9
WILLISTON & JAEGER, 5 SAMUEL WILLISTON & WALTER H.E. JAEGER, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1012C, at 38; UCITA attempts to codify
the common law rule, as it relates to merchants, by attaching an implied warranty
where there is special relationship of some sort. UCITA § 404(a).
101
Raymond T. Nimmer, Images and Contract Law--What Law Applies to
Transactions in Information, 36 Hous. L. Rev. 1, 47-48 (1999).
102
Restatement (Second) Of Contracts § 208.
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Limiting damages in lieu of consequential and special damages in service
contracts is defined by case law and in some instances by statutory law.103 Under
Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 356, damages may be liquidated in the
agreement if damages will be hard to anticipate and hard to prove. Liquidated
damages must, however, be a reasonable anticipation of the damages; otherwise,
it will likely be declared a penalty.104 The law addressing liquidated damages in
service contracts, in general, does not require parties to affirmatively assent to that
particular term.105

However, for service contracts that could be classed as

primarily for personal or home use, “express assent” may be required as “assent”
was contemplated for the protection of the consumer.106

103

See Cal. Civ. Code §1671 (“a provision in a contract liquidating the damages
for the breach of the contract is valid unless the party seeking to invalidate the
provision establishes that the provision was unreasonable under the circumstances
existing at the time the contract was made.”).
104
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356(a) ("A term fixing
unreasonably large liquidated damages is unenforceable on grounds of public
policy as a penalty").
105
For property transactions see CAL. CIV. CODE § 1677 (Any provision
liquidating damages in a real estate transaction requires "The provision [be]
separately signed or initialed by each party to the contract.") E-SIGN and UETA
(not California’s UETA) specially exempts real estate transactions from their
statutory reach.
106
Cal Civ. Code §1671 (“The validity of a liquidated damages provision shall be
determined under subdivision (d) and not under subdivision (b) where
the liquidated damages are sought to be recovered from either: ¶ (1) A party to a
contract for the retail purchase, or rental, by such party of personal property or
services, primarily for the party' s personal, family, or household purposes; or ¶
(2) A party to a lease of real property for use as a dwelling by the party or those
dependent upon the party for support. ¶ (d) In the cases described in subdivision
(c), a provision in a contract liquidating damages for the breach of the contract is
void except that the parties to such a contract may agree therein upon an amount
which shall be presumed to be the amount of damage sustained by a breach
thereof, when, from the nature of the case, it would be impracticable or extremely
difficult to fix the actual damage.”).
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4.

Applicability of Browse-Wrap Agreements to Limitations
on Damages in Service Transactions
Generally speaking, common law service contracts do not require parties

to affirmatively assent to the terms that would disclaim or limit damages to a
certain amount. This means that terms as such may be used in browse-wrap
agreements.

However, consumer contracts, such as those in California, clearly

contemplate that parties "agree" to the specified amount, making it less likely that
acceptance by implication will withhold judicial scrutiny.107 That premise is
further supported if we look at the underlying policies for having consumer
protection terms in the first place, which was to try to ensure that consumers were
well aware of all the pitfalls associated with the terms.

Notwithstanding those

arguments, nothing appears to preclude the enforcement of liquidated damages
when contained in a browse-wrap agreement. However, the terms will still be
subject to common law doctrines such as procedural and substantive
unconscionability.

5.

Conclusions About Limiting Terms in Goods and Services
Contracts
Limiting terms differ from the prohibitory and mandatory terms discussed

in section III. The terms of limitation do not simply restate the rights associated
with a good or service as do prohibitory terms. Instead, limiting terms have
characteristics of mandatory terms, which usually require consumers to relinquish
certain rights such as the right to seek redress where the contract was entered into
or performed. However, limiting terms do not require consumers to perform
certain rights, such as filing suit in certain forums, nor do they preclude the types
of remedies one can obtain. With that said, it appears that limiting terms will not
107

Cal. Civ. Code § 1671(c)(1).
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face an obstacle to enforcement because onerous mandatory terms have been
enforced that may serve precedence for less onerous terms.
The primary obstacle to enforcement, aside from the notice and assent
requisites (aka formation), seems to be the procedural requirements like the type
of language that must be used or the font size that should be used in the sale of
goods.

Browse-wrap contracts in this context are not immune from substantive

requirements either and they will face challenges related to what is being taken
away from the consumer in relation to other terms of the contract.

B.

Terms Pertaining to Consumer Information
The use of consumer related information is a hotly debated topic.108 A

significant amount of litigation stems from website privacy policies, which are
viewed by some as an executory contract between the website and its users.109
Apart from the litigation related to those policies, debate has also centered around
tracking the online footprint of consumers and what is done with that information.
In 2000, the Federal Trade Commission surveyed consumer concerns and
found that some 92% of online consumers are concerned about how their
consumer information may be misused. That same study estimated that the fear
of the misuse of consumer information would cost online businesses
approximately $18 billion in 2002. That fear continues to grow as consumers
flock110 to the Internet.111
108

WILLIAMS & SMYTH, COMPUTER AND INTERNET LIABILITY, STRATEGIES,
CLAIMS AND DEFENSES, § 4.01(C) (2003 Supp.) ("One of the most commonly
voiced concerns with regard to online privacy is the tremendous increase in the
practice by commercial interests of gathering and sharing personal information
about individual Internet users.").
109
L.J. KUTTEN, COMPUTER SOFTWARE PROTECTION, LIABILITY-LAW-FORMS,
§9:56 n.3 (2006).
110
Wall Street Journal, Monday November 21, 2005 (reporting that online sales
in 2005 are expected to be $26 billion); Majority of U.S. Adults Believe They
Are More Susceptible to Identity Theft During the Holiday Season, available at
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Many concerns have centered on protecting the expectations of consumers.112
The effect of those concerns has led courts,113 legislatures,114 regulators,115

http://www.prnewswire.com/cgibin/stories.pl?ACCT=104&STORY=/www/story/11-222005/0004221337&EDATE= (noting that in a survey commissioned by Sun
Microsystems “one in three adults have been a victim of identity theft or know
someone who has been victimized and a majority say they are likely to stop
shopping and banking with institutions that put their personal data at risk.”).
111
Identity Theft: Shocking Statistics, available at
http://bankinfosecurity.com/node/2686 (noting that “ID theft cost Americans
$52.6 billion in 2004.”).
112
Online Privacy Alliance, Guidelines for Online Privacy, at,
http://www.privacyalliance.org/resources/ppguidelines.shtml (last visited March
1, 2004).
Notice and Disclosure
An organization's privacy policy must be easy to find, read
and understand. The policy must be available prior to or at the time
that individually identifiable information is collected or requested.
The policy must state clearly: what information is being
collected; the use of that information; possible third party
distribution of that information; the choices available to an
individual regarding collection, use and distribution of the collected
information; a statement of the organization's commitment to data
security; and what steps the organization takes to ensure data
quality and access.
The policy should disclose the consequences, if any, of an
individual's refusal to provide information. The policy should also
include a clear statement of what accountability mechanism the
organization uses, including how to contact the organization.
113

See In re Pharmatrak, Inc., 329 F.3d 9 (2003); In Re DoubleClick, Inc. Privacy
Policy, 154 F.Supp.2d 497 (SDNY 2001); Liescke v. RealNetworks, 2000 WL
198424 (Feb. 11, 2000).
114
For a list of bills before the Congress in 2006 see Center for Democracy and
Technology at www.cdt.org/legislation/109/3 (last visited Nov. 11, 2006).
115
Federal Trade Commission, Privacy Online: Fair Information Practice in the
Electronic Market Place, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy2000/privacy2000.pdf (last visited March 1,
2004).
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consumer advocates116 and industry consortiums117 to set standards on the use of
consumer information. That resulted in a myriad of different statutes and
principles. Some commentators have noted, "American law covering personal
information is 'a patchwork of uneven, inconsistent, and often irrational' federal
and state rules."118

Types of Information
There are essentially two categories of electronic consumer information.
The first category of consumer information is personally identifiable information,
which includes a website visitor's name, address, telephone number and social
security number.119 The second category of consumer information is the non-

116

Electronic Privacy Information Center, www.epic.com (last visited March 1,
2004).
117
Online Privacy Alliance, Guidelines for Online Privacy, at,
http://www.privacyalliance.org/resources/ppguidelines.shtml (last visited March
1, 2004). This is a consortium made up of thirty of the leading businesses:
Acxiom, AOL Time Warner, Apple Computer, AT&T, Boeing, Cendant, Dell,
DoubleClick Inc., EarthLink, Inc., eBay Inc., EDS, Equifax, Ernst and Young,
Experian, IBM, Intuit, MCI, Microsoft, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Reed Elsevier,
SAS Institute Inc., Sun Microsystems, Verizon Communications, Yahoo!,
American Advertising Federation, Association for Competitive Technology,
Business Software Alliance, Association of National Advertisers, American
Association of Advertising Agencies, Information Technology Association of
America, Internet Alliance, Motion Picture Association of America, The United
States Chamber of Commerce.
118
JULIAN MILLSTEIN ET AL, DOING BUSINESS ON THE INTERNET, FORMS AND
ANALYSIS, § 10.03 (2006) (“There is no comprehensive privacy protection
legislation in the United States that addresses the collection, storage, transmission
or use of personal information on or from the Internet or in other business
environments.”); Vera Bergelson, It's Personal But Is It Mine?, 37 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 379, 391 (2003), quoting FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION
AGE 80 (1997).
119
Cal. Bus. & Prof. § 22577(a); Federal Trade Commission, Privacy Online: Fair
Information Practice in the Electronic Market Place, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy2000/privacy2000.pdf (last visited March 1,
2004). (pdf page 46 n. 54); Microsoft Makes Federal Privacy Push,
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identifying information such as click-stream data (websites previously visited),
gender, age and hobbies.120

The latter category refers to electronic information

that does not readily identify consumers.

a.

Personally Identifiable Information

Several pieces of federal legislation already regulate the use of personal
information.

Although federal legislation appears to be rooted in particular

industries like the banking sector or telecommunications and cable industry,121 a
penumbra of law based around electronic privacy is evolving. For example, the
Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984122 and the Video Privacy Protection

http://www.betanews.com/article/Microsoft_Makes_Federal_Privacy_Push/11310
43763 (November 3, 2005).
120
Federal Trade Commission, Privacy Online: Fair Information Practice in the
Electronic Market Place, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy2000/privacy2000.pdf (last visited March 1,
2004). (pdf page 46 n. 53, 54, 59).
121
Vera Bergelson, It's Personal But Is It Mine?, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 379,
391-92 (2003). For example, the financial and banking industries have recently
had to comply with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 1681 (2002),
which requires financial institutions to disclose to their customers how the
company uses a customer's personal information. Id. at 391 n.55. Similarly, the
Financial Modernization Service Act, 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 6701, 6801, 6901 (2003)
expands consumer protection by requiring financial institutions to allow
consumers to opt-out and forbid a company's use of personal information. Id. at
392 n. 55
Likewise, privacy protection is extended in the area of
telecommunications in the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18
U.S.C.S. § 521 which guards against the interception of electronic
communications. Id. at 392 n. 56. In addition, the Children's Online Privacy
Protection Act of 1999, 15 U.S.C.S. § 6501 et seq., forbids collection of
information from minors under the age of thirteen.
Educational institutions also must protect student records. See Family
Education and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C.A. § 1232(g)(2002).
122
47 U.S.C.S. § 521 (2003).

31

Act123 require consumers to opt-in, that is, give their affirmative consent by
marking a box with a check mark.124
The Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) also adds to the
legislative patchwork by mandating that affirmative parental consent be given for
certain uses of a child's information.125 The same could be said for the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA),126 and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
(CFFA).127
In 2003, the California legislature modified the Business and Professions
Code to address the use of personal identifiable information submitted by a
consumer to a website. 128 This amendment noted that no California law regulates
how and the extent to which personally identifiable consumer information is used
and collected on the Internet.129

This law requires commercial operators of

websites or online services “to post privacy policies that inform consumers who
are located in California of the Web site's or online service's information practices
with regard to consumers' personally identifiable information and to abide by
those terms."130

However, section 22575 stops short of requiring website

operators from mandating a website user’s consent before the information is
taken.

123

18 U.S.C.S. § 2701 (2003).
Kent Walker, The Cost of Privacy, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 87, 116.
However, the opt-out function allows the user/consumer to elect to withhold his
or her consent to the use of their personal information. The difference between
the two is essentially the default setting – the opt-in function starts with the
customer saying "No," where as the opt-out begins with the customer saying
"Yes." (2001).
125
15 U.S.C.A. § 6501(9) &(10).
126
18 U.S.C.A. § 2701.
127
18 U.S.C.A. §1030.
128
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22575. This piece of legislation mirrors the
language of COPPA, discussed above, except for the fact that no affirmative
consent is required when personally identifiable information is used.
129
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22575 preamble.
130
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2(a) Declaration.
124
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Consumer advocacy and industry consortium groups have also advocated
empowering consumers with a greater ability to control how their information is
used by the companies to which the information is given first hand, and how the
information is subsequently used by different companies.131 For example, the
Online Privacy Alliance declares that:
Individuals must be given the opportunity to exercise choice regarding
how individually identifiable information collected from them online may be
used when such use is unrelated to the purpose for which the information was
collected. At a minimum, individuals should be given the opportunity to opt
out of such use.
Additionally, in the vast majority of circumstances, where
there is third party distribution of individually identifiable
information, collected online from the individual, unrelated to the
purpose for which it was collected, the individual should be given
the opportunity to opt out.

b.

Non Personally Identifiable Information

The use of this type of information appears to be less regulated but has not
been ignored. This category of information refers to information that does not
specifically identify the Internet user, but refers to general information about the
habits of that user. Typically, this type of information is gathered with the use of
cookies,132 spyware,133 web bugs,134 and other programs that track the
131

See also JULIAN MILLSTEIN ET AL, DOING BUSINESS ON THE INTERNET, FORMS
AND ANALYSIS, § 10.04 (2006) (identifying other industry groups).
132

See Jessica J. Thill, The Cookie Monster: From Sesame Street to Your Hard
Drive, 52 SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW 921 (2001) (defining cookies as
“numerical identifiers deposited onto a user’s hard drive in order to recognize an
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whereabouts of those surfing the Internet. In most instances, the ultimate purpose
of those tracking devices is to offer targeted advertising which is currently a
multi-billion dollar market.135
The debate surrounding the use of cookies has been around for many years
and U.S. legislatures have been slow to address concerns related to cookies. On
the other hand, courts have interpreted existing legislation to apply to the use of
tracking cookies. For example, in In Re DoubleClick, Inc. Privacy Policy, 154
F.Supp.2d 497 (SDNY 2001), consumers brought a class action suit against
DoubleClick for accessing and intercepting communications under the Electronic
Consumer Protection Act.136 DoubleClick tracked consumers by adding cookies
on to user’s hard drives when the consumers visited particular websites.
Thereafter, DoubleClick used that information to build profiles on the consumers

Internet user each time she accesses a certain website. Internet companies use
cookies primarily to collect information about the user – site preferences,
shopping habits, search queries, clickstreams and sometimes even a user’s name,
email address, and other personal information. However, cookies also allow a
website to personalize site information, offer shopping cart capabilities, remember
user names and passwords for future visits, and monitor website traffic.”
133
JULIAN MILLSTEIN ET AL, DOING BUSINESS ON THE INTERNET, FORMS AND
ANALYSIS, § 10.02 (“’Spyware’ is a term that has come to be applied to a range
of software technologies that enable the remote monitoring of activities on an
individual user's computer.”)
134
JULIAN MILLSTEIN ET AL, DOING BUSINESS ON THE INTERNET, FORMS AND
ANALYSIS, § 10.02 (“involve the placing of a text file or graphic on a Web page or
in an e-mail message for the purpose of tracking or monitoring activity on that
page or e-mail.”)
135
See www.marketingvox.com/archives/2006/04/20/iabpwc_internet_advertising
_revenues_at_record_125_billion (reporting online advertising hit a record of
$12.5 billion); www.iab.net/news/pr_2006_05_30.asp (noting that online
advertising revenue increased over 30% during the first quarter of 2006).
136
In Re DoubleClick, Inc. Privacy Policy, 154 F.Supp.2d 497, 507 (SDNY 2001)
(plaintiffs also pled under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, but they failed to
meet their burden relating to loss as required under that statute and since the
court’s discussion on this point did not involve consent it will not be discussed).
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based on certain searches they performed.137 Targeted advertising would then be
prompted by the DoubleClick planted cookie if the user visited a website serviced
by DoubleClick. In essence, that cookie would send a message to DoubleClick
servers about the consumer’s recent Internet history, which included searches
made by the consumer, and offer advertising that tracked the previous visits.
Plaintiffs claimed these actions violated ECPA. The court, however, rejected that
argument because the information the consumers submitted to the websites was
intercepted with the consent of the owners of the website.138
Concurrently with the rise of the DoubleClick litigation, the Electronic
Privacy Information Center (EPIC) filed a complaint that prompted the Federal
Trade Commission to investigate DoubleClick for the use of “online profiling” in
contravention of its privacy policy.139 EPIC urged the FTC to require DoubleClick
to obtain the “express consent” of Internet users before tracking their online
activities on the web.140 The FTC did not, however, proceed further than the face
of the privacy policy and concluded DoubleClick had not engaged in unfair
business practices in contravention of its policy.141
In In re Pharmatrak, Inc., the court addressed the use of cookies under the
ECPA as well. Plaintiffs in this case sued pharmaceutical companies with an
online presence142 and a tracking service company called Pharmatrak for the use
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In Re DoubleClick, Inc. Privacy Policy, 154 F.Supp.2d 497, 502-03 (SDNY
2001); Yonatan Lupu, The Wiretap Act & Web Monitoring: A Breakthrough for
Privacy Rights? 9 VIRGINIA J. L. & TECH. 3, 13 (2004).
138
In Re DoubleClick, Inc. Privacy Policy, 154 F.Supp.2d 497, 510-12 (SDNY
2001);
139
Jessica J. Thill, The Cookie Monster: From Sesame Street to Your Hard Drive,
52 SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW 921, 927-28 (2001).
140
Jessica J. Thill, The Cookie Monster: From Sesame Street to Your Hard Drive,
52 SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW 921, 927-28 (2001).
141
Jessica J. Thill, The Cookie Monster: From Sesame Street to Your Hard Drive,
52 SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW 921, 928 (2001).
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In re Pharmatrak, Inc., 329 F.3d 9, 16 (1st Cir. 2003) (American Home
Products Corp., Glaxo Wellcome, Inc., Pfizer, Inc., Pharmacia Corp., and
SmithKline Beecham Corp.).
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of personal information and other identifying information.143 Plaintiffs alleged
that they were invited to the pharmaceutical websites to learn about certain drugs
and obtain rebates.144 While on those websites, the consumers were tracked with
persistent cookies,145 and data was collected about the users’ habits on the various
pharmaceutical websites.146

The court reported that Pharmatrak used

approximately 18.7 million persistent cookies through the software it sold to those
websites.147
Pharmatrak offered the information it gathered to pharmaceutical
companies by means of a comparative analysis.148 The pharmaceutical companies
were able to understand the manner in which consumers accessed the website, the
time they spent on the site, and the visitor’s IP address.149

Most of the

pharmaceutical websites stated that they wanted no personally identifiable
information about the consumers.150 However, it became evident that the non
personally identifiable information could be combined with personal information
by running a relative easy software program.
The Pharmatrak court noted some similarities to the DoubleClick
litigation, but made a critical distinction. The website owners in DoubleClick had
authorized DoubleClick to obtain personal information, whereas, in Phramatrak,
the websites had expressly forbade the use of personal information.151 The court
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In re Pharmatrak, Inc., 329 F.3d 9, 15 (1st Cir. 2003) (names, addresses,
telephone numbers, email addresses, dates of birth, genders, insurance statuses,
education levels, occupations, medical conditions, medications, and reasons for
visiting the particular website).
144
In re Pharmatrak, Inc., 329 F.3d, 12 (2003).
145
In re Pharmatrak, Inc., 329 F.3d, 14 (2003) (cookies that did not expire after
the user left the website).
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In re Pharmatrak, Inc., 329 F.3d, 14 (2003).
147
In re Pharmatrak, Inc., 329 F.3d, 15 (2003).
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In re Pharmatrak, Inc., 329 F.3d, 12 (2003).
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In re Pharmatrak, Inc., 329 F.3d, 13 (2003).
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In re Pharmatrak, Inc., 329 F.3d, 12 (2003).
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In re Pharmatrak, Inc., 329 F.3d 19-21 (2003).

36

in Pharmatrak found this difference warranted a different result than the
DoubleClick result.
Significantly, in Phramatrak, the circuit court was unwilling to find that
the website users “consented” to the use of their personal information based on
the mere use of a website or purchase of services from a website152 because
nothing on the website suggested that the website users’ use of the website would
amount to consent to use their personal information by a third party.153 In fact,
the Court stated:
Pharmatrak makes a frivolous argument that the internet users visiting
client Pharmacia's webpage for rebates on Detrol thereby consented to
Pharmatrak's intercepting their personal information. On that theory,
every online communication would provide consent to interception by a
third party.154
In other instances, consumers have also sought to protect their online
privacy rights by focusing on the privacy policies themselves. For example,
toysrus.com settled a California based class action suit wherein plaintiffs alleged
that the company used cookies and web-bugs to track the purchasing preferences
of visitors on the toysrus.com website.155 Thereafter, ToysRUs forwarded that
information to another company without the knowledge of the consumer.156
Those actions were apparently contrary to the site’s own privacy policies.
Ultimately, toysrus.com settled the claim and was required to pay “attorney's fees
and costs of up to $900,000, edit its website to include clear and conspicuous
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websites gave no indication that use meant consent to collection of personal
information by a third party. Rather, Pharmatrak's involvement was meant to be
invisible to the user, and it was. Deficient notice will almost always defeat a claim
of implied consent.”)
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links to its privacy policy, provide notices as to policy changes, and obtain
consent before engaging in activities outside the parameters of its privacy
policy.”157

c.

Browse-Wrap and Assent to Privacy
Policies

While there is a general trend towards protecting consumer information,
no law mandates website owners to obtain the “express consent” of the average
adult Internet user. A strong argument can be made that implied consent through
the use of a browse-wrap privacy policy will affect the terms stated therein. That
position is further bolstered by California’s Business and Professions Code
section 22575 et seq., as it does not require express assent, but mandates that
websites post a conspicuous notice regarding the privacy policy. However, that
result could be read as contrary to the Pharmatrak decision as the court seemed
unwilling to find “consent” through mere use of a website. Still, Pharamatrak
could be harmonized with California’s privacy act because the court emphasized a
lack of indicia pertaining to what might result in consent. Presumably, if a
privacy policy is posted with indicia as such, it could be grounds to enforce the
policy against the user. The effect as such would be consistent with the browsewrap cases described above, especially the Specht case.
Privacy terms are treated differently when compared to those related to
arbitration, choice of law, venue and unfair trade practices. The latter terms have
been enforced without regard to the initial notice of terms.

In other words, the

terms appear under the guise of “terms of use,” not “arbitration terms” or the like.
157

Stephen F. Ambrose, Jr., Joseph W. Gelb, Consumer Privacy Regulation &
Litigation in the United States, 59 BUS. LAW. 1251, 1255 (2004). In a similar
vein, the Federal Trade Commission brought charges against Guess.com for
misrepresenting terms stated in its privacy policy. Id. at 1153. See also
Collegenet, Inc. v. XAP Corporation, 03-CV-1229-BR , page 15(July 17, 2006).
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In fact, California requires a privacy statement to be part of a home page or the
next significant page on the website.158 Alternatively, the privacy statement may
be posted by hyperlink or the like.159 Some of the most popular e-commerce
industry players have chosen to post a hyperlinked privacy policy.160 According
to the Federal Trade Commission the top 100 commercial websites post privacy
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Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 22577(b)(1).
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 22577(b)(2)-(3).
160
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(http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/privacy-policy.html); www.passport.net
(https://accountservices.passport.net/PPPrivacyStatement.srf?x=3.200.4104.0&cb
alt=www&vv=320&lc=1033); www.amazon.com
(http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/browse/-/468496/104-49924073895939); www.microsoft.com (http://www.microsoft.com/info/privacy.mspx);
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(http://viewmorepics.myspace.com/misc/privacy.html?z=1&Mytoken=200409171
13647)
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policies.161 Laws like California’s and the action of online companies appear to
have forged a requirement that privacy policies be their “own animal.” This
strongly suggests that the privacy policies should not be “noticed” in the “terms of
use” portion of the website to avoid the effect of procedural unconscionability.
Instead, privacy policies should be their own hyperlink.
Indeed, posting privacy terms apart from other terms of use appears to be
well grounded. Consumer information in the browse-wrap context is different
from the categories discussed above because consumer information is used by
companies for purposes unrelated to the initial transaction. For example, cookies
are often used to track how the user got to the website and so forth.

The

information given by consumers is not typically the basis of the bargain and may
be used outside the scope of the transaction, especially when the information is
sold to other companies for marketing purposes.

V.

Conclusion
Browse-wrap agreements have grown out of the need to govern the

relationship between the website host and the users that visit the website. Over
the past several years a body of law has developed that supports the use of
browse-wrap agreements, as long as notice is proper and the terms are in accord
with fundamental aspects of contract law. Case law, legislation and industry
custom have each contributed to how browse-wrap contracts should be treated in
certain contexts. Some terms that have escaped judicial review appear to be
related to intellectual property and consumer protection terms.

Nevertheless,

given analogous precedence and industry trend, there may not be obstacles to
enforcing those terms, but care must be given to ensure consumer expectations are
addressed so as to avoid an unfair result.
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Enforcing Privacy Promises: Section 5 of the FTC Act, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/privacyinitiatives/promises.html (last visited Dec. 19,
2005)
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